In this paper, we argue that empirical studies of the relationship between popular support for Islamism and support for democracy and violence have yielded inconclusive results, largely because scholars inadequately operationalize respondent support for shari`a.
Introduction
Scholars and policy analysts have devoted much effort to understanding the relationship between popular support for Islamism and support for democratic politics and Islamist militancy. Empirical studies testing these relationships have generally been inconclusive, either showing no significant relationship or presenting contradictory findings (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 2002; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Tessler, Jamal, & Robbins, 2012; Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; Kaltenthaler, 2010; Fair, Ramsey, & Kull, 2008; Tessler & Nachtwey, 1998; Haddad, 2003) . In this paper, we argue that these discordant empirical findings, in large part, derive from problems with measuring support for shari`a in quantitative models. Scholars have frequently operationalized Islamism, defined as an ideology that locates political legitimacy in the application of the shari`a, inadequately.
2 They have either operationalized support for shari`a by employing respondent support for the implementation of Islamic law generally or for only specific Islamic tenets or prescriptions (e.g., Haddad, 2003; Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013; Tessler, 2002) . Consequently, extant scholarship fails to adequately characterize the respondent's interpretation of Islamic law because analysts use variables that either reflect abstract patterns of support for a combination of religion and politics or, alternatively, support for very specific aspects of Islamic law. This sub-optimal operationalization has precluded scholars both from appreciating the important variation in respondents' interpretations of and levels of support for shari`a, and from positing a relationship between certain types of support for shari`a and support for democracy and Islamist violence. We argue that the relationships among support for shari`a, democracy, and Islamist violence depend upon on a more accurate appreciation of the multi-faceted nature of shari`a and concomitant operationalization of the concept.
In this paper, we examine how varying conceptualizations of an Islamic government, defined broadly as one guided by shari`a, relate to support for democratic values and support for Islamist militant groups in Pakistan. We do so by addressing the empirical challenges posed by the complex concept of shari`a through a carefully designed survey instrument that offers unique insights into how Pakistanis define a shari`a-based government. We employ these novel data to identify two distinct components of shari`a government in Pakistan: a transparent and fair government that provides for people, and a government that imposes Islamic social and legal norms. We find that conceptualizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by providing services and security for the people is associated with increased support for democratic values, whereas conceptualizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by imposing hudud punishments and restricting women's public roles is associated with increased support for militancy. This result demonstrates that depending on how individuals within a particular context and time period construe a shari`a-based government, public support for shari`a can either be a positive force for democracy or a predictor of support for militant politics. Our findings also imply that future survey work on related topics should account for this complexity by adequately capturing both dimensions of shari`a in fielded survey instruments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first review the literature on the relationship between support for shari`a and support for democracy and militancy.
Next we discuss how scholars have generally operationalized shari`a, highlighting the theoretical vagueness and measurement issues that undergird these studies. We then provide some background on the history of Islam and politics in Pakistan, the context of our study, and propose a way to more accurately conceptualize support for shari`a that captures its multifaceted and often contradictory nature. Finally, we describe our data and empirical strategy, and turn to our results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these studies for future research and for policy.
Shari`a and Support for Democracy
Previous scholars who have examined the relationship between Islamism and support for democracy have produced contradictory findings. Early scholars theorized support for Islamism, equated with support for the implementation of political and social tenets of the shari`a, and democratic values to be negatively related and, thus, incompatible. This scholarship drew from the literature on political culture, which argues that a specific type of political culture with accompanying value systems is an essential precondition for the establishment or successful persistence of effective democracy (Lipset, 1959; Almond and Verba, 1963) . In contrast to conclusions that certain institutional configurations are sufficient for maintaining democratic political systems, Inglehart (2000) noted that the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens are key to the survival of democracy. Based on this notion of the importance of a particular political culture, scholars linked the lack of successful democratization in the Middle East to a lack of amenable political culture as created by Islam (Gellner, 1981; Lewis, 1990; Huntington, 1996 (Tessler, 2002) .
Shari`a and Support for Militancy
Scholars have similarly explored the relationship between support for shari`a and support for Islamist militancy, a term which encompasses a number of types of violence and policy positions. Within this line of inquiry, support for militancy is often assumed to be in opposition to support for democracy. For example, Kirwin and Cho (2009) The study of religion and militancy suggests that while the relationship is complex, religion can often promote violence (Wellman and Tokuno, 2004) . Work by Juergensmeyer (2003 Juergensmeyer ( , 2008 
Support for Shari`a: Measurement Issues
In this section, we identify a major measurement issue in the existing literature that may significantly contribute to and explain the incongruous results in existing studies of the relationship between individual-level support for Islamism and support for both violence and democracy. However, it is important to first discuss the theoretical complexities inherent in the concept of shari`a before discussing its measurement.
Shari`a is difficult to define and thus operationalize due to the significant pluralism and variation that exists within specific religious traditions, and which results in two innate divergences. The first divergence occurs between text and practice. Redfield (1956) articulates this as a division between a religion's "great" and "little" traditions. The "great" tradition is the reflective, orthodox, textual, "consciously cultivated and handed down" (70) tradition, while the "little" tradition can be described as heterodox, local, and popular, and varies across groups and even individuals that may be considered part of the same larger faith tradition. This is not unique to Islam; all major world religions encompass both a written component as well as a varied practical component. A second divergence occurs between the practiced traditions of religion.
Practiced religion differs significantly within different regional, national, or sub-national contexts, within different sects, and even across individuals within any of these given contexts (Geertz, 1971; Lukens-Bull, 1999) . In order to capture these two divergences into one term encompassing all possible permutations of a religious tradition, Asad argues that Islam is a "discursive tradition." 4 As a result, Asad argues, all practices that relate themselves to the religious discursive tradition, however this relationship is manifested, should be considered part of that religion and studied as such.
Implicit in this description is the assumption that the lived and practiced tradition will be heterogeneous and possibly contradictory across Muslims in different times, places, and communities, though these varied practices draw legitimacy from the same discursive tradition. This multiplicity of practiced Islams has implications for defining shari`a and Islamism in empirical work; Islamism's definition as an ideology that locates political legitimacy in the application of the shari`a pegs it to the complicated and unfixed concept of the shari`a, which is interpreted differently across practitioners. The meaning of the term shari`a has changed over time in both scholarship as well as in practice, from a type of legal training and learning process, to the institutionalization of specific Islamic legal institutions, to a more narrow approach limited to implementing specific and identifiably Islamic legal rules derived from the Qur`an and the Sunnah (Brown, 1997 ).
Yet even this narrower definition of shari`a employed in contemporary periods differs across contexts and actors. Various definitions of shari`a draw from any combination of the prescriptions outlined in the Qur`an and the Sunnah related to larger societal issues of politics, economics, justice, and social organization, in addition to personal issues such as sexual intercourse, hygiene, diet, and prayer (Schwedler, 2011) . should be organized and governed (Kramer, 1993) .
In addition to these theoretical complexities, scholars have tended to be imprecise and inconsistent in how they operationalize, and measure support for, shari`a. Thus, these studies serve as an example of the concept misspecification of which Sartori (1970) warned. By not fully or appropriately incorporating the multidimensional and subjective nature of shari`a into the quantification of support for the concept, political scientists have lost precision in not only defining but also operationalizing this term. The concept formation of accurately and adequately defining shari`a should come prior to its quantification. As a result, it is possible that no relationship has generally been found between strong Islamic values and support for democracy or militancy because the correct questions about shari`a have not been asked or correctly utilized, rather than because these relationships do not exist. Islamicization initiates in order to bolster the government's sagging popularity and to coopt Islamist (political and militant) groups who were rallying against it (Qadeer, 2005; Nasr, 2001; Rizvi, 2000) .
In 1977 . In addition to the Shi'i maslak, which itself has multiple sects, there are four Sunni masalik: Barelvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Jamaat-eIslami (which is also a political party that purports to be supra-sectarian). Each maslak has its own definition of shari`a and looks to different sources of Islamic legitimacy (Reetz, 2009; Rahman, 2004) . Pakistan was governed "completely" or "a lot" by Islamic principles, one half believed that it was governed "a moderate amount" or a "little," and twenty percent thought it wasn't governed at all by Islamic principles. Additionally, the vast majority of respondents (69 percent) indicated that Shari`a should play either a "much larger role" or a "somewhat larger role." Only twenty percent thought it should play "about the same role," and fewer than ten percent believed that it should play "a somewhat" or a "much smaller role."
The survey also included a battery of questions about shari`a to better understand the components that Pakistanis include in this concept (results included in Table 1 ). The vast majority of respondents (more than 95 percent) indicated that a shari`a government provides services, justice, personal security and is free of corruption. In contrast, a smaller majority (55 percent) believed that shari`a is a government that uses physical punishments. Given the generally positive attributes that respondents ascribe to shari`a, it is not surprising that the minority see Pakistan as being governed under those principles and that they would like a greater role for shari`a. The results from this initial survey in Pakistan suggest that at least two components -a person's general preference for good governance, and a demand for a legal regime based on Qur'anic principles of justice and punishment -are salient dimensions of shari`a in Pakistan and should be incorporated into its definition when employing measurements of support for shari`a within this context. We do not claim that these two components are universal in defining or driving support for shari`a; it is most likely impossible to provide a universal understanding of the concept based on the above cited theories of religion and politicized religion. However, when we look at these definitions within a specific country-context, we do see systematic agreement about the components of shari`a within the limited boundaries of a community. The combination of extensive knowledge of the context and a carefully designed survey instrument provides the information necessary to address important measurement issues in defining and operationalizing support for shari`a within one context. In the case of Pakistan, we hypothesize that conceptualizing a shari`a-based government as one that provides transparent services, justice, and personal security will be positively related to support for democracy. Additionally, conceptualizing a shari`a-based government as one that imposes physical punishments will be associated with greater support for Islamist militancy.
Data
In order to expand upon the novel shari`a-related findings of Fair et al. (2010) The team hired SEDCO, a major Pakistani survey firm, to administer the survey.
The principal investigators (PIs), one of whom is proficient in Urdu, worked with SEDCO to train enumerators and design a sampling plan. A description of the training and interviewer guidelines to ensure compliance with institutional review board (IRB) protocols, as well as more information on the survey development and implementation, can be found in Appendix 1.
In the four main provinces of Pakistan, the data include district-representative samples of 155-675 households in 61 districts. Within each province, SEDCO sampled the two largest districts and subsequently selected a random sample of additional districts. In the FATA, the data include agency-representative samples of 270-675 people in each of the six agencies where our enumerators could travel. Samples within districts/agencies were purchased from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 10 The overall response rate was 71%, with 14.5% of households contacted refusing to take the survey and 14.5% of the targeted households not interviewed because no one was home.
Descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 2 . 10 Since Pakistan has experienced substantial, heterogeneous population growth since the last census in 1998, we do not calculate post-stratification weights. Our results should therefore be taken as representative for our sample which, while large, does over-represent Pakistanis from the lesser-populated provinces. 
Defining a Shari`a Based Government in Pakistan
The survey instrument included a battery of six items aimed at developing an even more nuanced understanding of respondent beliefs about a shari`a-based government in Pakistan. 11 The instructions read, "Here is a list of things some people say about shari`a. Tell us which ones you agree with." The enumerator then asked the respondent whether he/she agreed or disagreed that shari`a government means:
11 There was an additional item in the battery that read, "A government that requires women to veil in public." We exclude this item from the analyses because women's choice to veil has many interpretations in Pakistan. For example, some women believe that veiling is liberating because it allows them to work next to men. Similarly, many in Pakistan view veiling as a means of moving about publicly without the harassing gaze of men objectifying them. In this context, some Pakistanis would view this requirement as being protective of women, not restricting them. Others yet view the veil as a sartorial expression of their Pakistani Muslim identity as opposed to Western secularizing influences which they interpret as undermining Pakistani identity. Thus choosing to veil is a form of political protest against westernization and what they view as neo-imperialism. This is in addition to other interpretations that view veiling as a means of restricting women's mobility. As recent scholarship attests, this is not unique to Pakistan (see inter alia Mansson McGinty, 2014; Bullock, 2000; Yun, 2010; Khan, 1995) .
 A government that provides basic services such as health facilities, schools, garbage collection, road maintenance  A government that does not have corruption  A government that provides personal security  A government that provides justice through functioning non-corrupt courts  A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law  A government that restricts women's role in the public (working, attending school, going out in public)
We expected these questions to capture two distinct conceptualizations of a shari`a-based government: one that conceptualizes shari`a as a non-corrupt government that provides services, security, and justice for the people, and one that conceptualizes shari`a as imposing punitive interpretations of Islamic legal and social norms.
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the shari`a questions do in fact load onto two distinct factors, which we refer to as provides and imposes (see Appendix 2 for the factor analysis). Therefore, we created two index variables, rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
Provides captures the respondent's support for defining a shari`a-based government as one that is free from corruption and provides services, personal security, and justice.
Imposes captures the respondent's support for defining a shari`a-based government as one that implements hudud punishments and restricts women's role in public. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents who report agreeing that each item is a component of shari`a government. The vast majority of respondents agree that a shari`a government is one the provides security, justice, and basic services, and is noncorrupt. Fewer, but still over half of respondents, agree that a shari`a government is one that uses physical punishment to make sure people obey the law, and slightly less than half agree that a shari`a government is one that restricts women's role in the public sphere. As shown in Figure 1 , the mean of the provides index is 0.89 (sd = .21) and the mean of the imposes index is 0.52 (sd = .042).
Figure 1: Item-Wise Support for Shari`a Indices
At the individual level, viewing a shari`a government as one that provides for the people and as one that imposes punitive interpretations of Islamic legal and social norms is not zero-sum. Instead, many people seem to hold both views at the same time. In Table   3 , we bin people by their scores on both the provides and imposes indices (high = above the median, low = below the median). Nearly half of respondents are above the median on provides and below the median on imposes, while another quarter of respondents are above the median on both. Only 7.85 percent of respondents are below the median on 
Shari`a and support for democratic values
We use responses to six questions to assess respondent support for democratic values, tapping into important procedural and ideological components central to the concept of democracy. For example, respondents were asked, "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?"
Response categories included "extremely important," "very important," "moderately important," "slightly important," and "not important at all." 12 We combined the six democracy questions into an index, scaled from 0 to 1. As shown in Figure 2 , support for 12 See Appendix 3 for the battery of questions used to operationalize this democracy variable. See also Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2013 democratic values is high in this sample of Pakistanis, with scores on the index heavily skewed toward 1 (mean = 0.75, sd = 0.18).
Figure 2. High level of support for democratic values among respondents
To test how the two different conceptualizations of shari`a are related to democratic values, we use ordinary least squares regression with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level. We estimate the following basic model:
where Yi is a continuous variable representing support for democratic values, Di is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as providing for the people,
Xi is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as imposing Islamic legal and social norms, αj are district fixed effects, and εi is a normally distributed error term. We then add in a set of demographic covariates, including gender, age, ethnicity, 
Democracy Index
Density formal education level, household expenditures, household assets, and indicators for head of household, urban location, able to read, and able to perform arithmetic.. In a third specification of the model, we add additional religiosity covariates, including indicators for religious sect (Ahl-e-sunnat, Deobandi, Ahl-e-hadis, and Shia), number of times the respondent prays namaz per week, and an indicator for prays tahajjud namaz. 13 In our final specification, we use tehsil instead of district fixed effects, in addition to the full set of demographic and religiosity controls.
14 Across all four specifications of our model, we find that conceptualizing a shari`a government as one that provides for the people is positively associated with support for democratic values, whereas conceptualizing a shari`a government as one that imposes hudud punishments and restrictions upon women is not statistically significantly related to support for democratic values (regression results in Table 4 ). 15 At the individual level, scores on both the provides and imposes indices seem to matter. Individuals who are above the median on provides but below the median on imposes are more supportive of democratic values than those who are above the median on both provides and imposes (p=0.005). In other words, individual respondents who believe that a shari`a government is one that provides for the people are more supportive of democratic values when they do not also hold the view that a shari`a government is one that imposes Islamic punitive legal and social norms. Additionally, these latter individuals who are high on provides 13 Pakistanis tend to use the word "namaz" for prayer. (Arabic speakers may prefer to use the word "salat.") There are five set prayer times during which time all Muslims are expected to cease all activity and offer prayers. In some countries, men and women both both to mosques to offer these prayers. In Pakistan, women do not tend to offer prayers in a mosque. Instead they offer them at home. Tahajjud is a nonobligatory, additional prayer. 14 In Pakistan, there are 3 main sub-national administrative units: province, districts, tehsils. There are four main provinces: the Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies, the agency is the basic administrative unit. 15 Expanded regression tables for all analyses showing the coefficients and standard errors for covariates can be found in Appendix 4.
but low on imposes are more supportive of democratic values than individuals who understand a shari`a government to be one that imposes Islamic legal and social norms but not as providing for the people (p=0.000), and than individuals who do not strongly conceptualize a shari`a government as either providing or imposing (p=0.000). 
Shari`a and support for Islamist militancy
To measure support for Islamist militancy, the survey included questions on respondents' level of support for two Pakistan-based, Deobandi militant groups: the antiShia Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) and the Afghan Taliban. 16 More specifically, respondents were asked how much they support each militant group and its actions on a five-point scale ranging from "A great deal" to "Not at all." We average responses to these two questions to get a direct measure of support for these important Deobandi militant groups (scaled from 0 to 1). We find that support for Islamist militancy is relatively low among respondents in this sample. As shown in Figure 3 , mean support for SSP is 0.30 (sd = .34) and mean support for the Afghan Taliban is .25 (sd = .33).
However, asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations can be problematic in places afflicted by political violence. First, item non-response rates to such sensitive and direct questions are often quite high given that respondents may fear that providing the "wrong" answer will threaten their own and their family's safety. In this dataset, non-response rates for the direct questions assessing support for SSP and the Afghan Taliban were 17.1 and 13.3 percent, respectively. Second, responses may be subject to social desirability bias, as respondents may answer in ways they think will appease presumably higher-status enumerators, rather than divulging their personal attitudes. Respondents may be sensitive to differences between themselves and the enumerator with respect to ethnic, sectarian, social, economic, or even communal backgrounds.
16 While the Afghan Taliban focus their efforts upon ousting foreign troops and undermining the current democratic structure in Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban's various leadership shuras (consultative groups) are based in Pakistan. Additionally, the Afghan Taliban have long enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan as well as ongoing logistical, financial, military and diplomatic support from Pakistan. For these reasons we call the Afghan Taliban "Pakistan-based." It should also be noted that SSP and the Afghan Taliban have longstanding ties to one another (Abou Zahab, 2002) .
We therefore also use an indirect measure of support for specific Islamist organizations in the form of an endorsement experiment. 17 Endorsement experiments were first used in a conflict area to study support for political violence by Blair, Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2011) , and have since been used in other similar contexts. 18 In the present survey, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or to a control group. Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, measured on a five-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for the analysis. 19 The research team identified policies for use in the experiment by closely perusing Pakistani domestic press accounts and conducting extensive pre-testing and focus groups. They selected four contemporary policy proposals that were relatively well known but about which Pakistanis were unlikely to have extremely hardened opinions:
(1) plans to bring in the army to deal with the violence in Karachi; (2) To test how the two conceptualizations of shari`a government are related to support for militancy using the direct measurement, we employ the same ordinary least squares regression strategy used above for democratic values. We estimate the following basic model:
where Zi is a continuous variable representing support for democratic values, Di is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as providing for the people,
Xi is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as imposing Islamic S ip a h − e − S a h a b a P a k is ta n P a k is ta n T a li b a n A fg h a n T a li b a n M il it a n t G r o u p A v e r a g e To analyze the results of the endorsement experiment, we estimate the following ordinary least squares regression model:
where Pi is a continuous variable representing average support for the four target policies,
Ti is a dummy variable representing assignment to any militant group treatment condition, Di is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as providing for the people, Xi is a continuous variable for conceptualizing a shari`a government as imposing Islamic legal and social norms, αj are district fixed effects, and εi is a normally distributed error term. Our key parameters of interest are β3 and β5, from which we can derive the marginal effect of conceptualizing shari`a as providing for the people on support for militancy (β3), and conceptualizing shari`a as imposing Islamic legal and social norms on support for militancy (β5). Because the endorsement treatment was assigned at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level, standard errors are clustered at that level. In additional specifications of the model, we include (1) demographic covariates, (2) demographic and religiosity covariates, and (3) tehsil fixed effects plus the full set of demographic and religiosity covariates.
Overall, we find that conceptualizing a shari`a-based government as one that imposes Islamic legal and social norms is positively associated with support for militancy. This finding is consistent across the direct measurement of support for militancy and the endorsement experiment, and is robust to a number of specifications of the model (regression results presented in Table 5 women's role in public are more supportive of militancy than those who do not, even if they also believe that a shari`a-based government provides for the people.
Conceptualizing a shari`a-based government as one that provides for the people has a less clear and consistent relationship with support for militancy (regression results presented in Table 5 ). When using the direct measurement, provides has a negative but not statistically significant relationship to support for militancy. In other words, conceptualizing a shari`a government as providing for the people is associated with slightly less support for militancy, but not significantly so. When using the endorsement experiment to get an indirect measure of support for Islamist militancy, provides has a positive but not statistically significant relationship to support for militancy. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the relationship between conceptualizing shari`a as providing for the people and support for militancy in this sample. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that Pakistanis in a nationally representative sample largely hold two different, albeit not necessarily opposing, conceptualizations of an Islamic government guided by shari`a. One conceptualization supposes a government that is transparent, fair, and provides services. The other articulates a government that imposes hudud punishments and restricts participation of women in civic life.
We find that these two conceptualizations relate differently to support for democratic values and support for militant groups in Pakistan. Disambiguating these differing conceptions allows us to reconcile many of the existing and discordant studies on these topics. On the one hand, conceptualizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by providing services and security for the people is associated with increased support for democratic values. On the other hand, conceptualizing an Islamic government as one that implements shari`a by imposing hudud punishments and restricting women's public roles is associated with increased support for militancy.
These results suggest that support for shari`a, a theoretically and practically complex topic, should not be operationalized as a unidimensional concept. Doing so limits scholarly understanding of shari`a's predictive power for a variety of attitudes and values. As with any type of government, Islamic governments can be conceptualized to perform a multitude of services. Individuals within the same political and national contexts can have different interpretations of what a shari`a government actually means, and these varying definitions will change the way that support for shari`a relates to other attitudes that policymakers and scholars find important. As a result, researchers must be extremely careful in how they operationalize this complicated phenomenon, by understanding what shari`a means in the population that they are studying, and by carefully designing surveys and other research tools to accurately capture these definitions. Our survey suggests that extensive batteries of questions, such as those included in our instrument, must be included in future survey instruments to adequately do so.
Finally, our findings have implications for policymakers who rely upon extant facile or incomplete measurements of shari`a to predict adverse developments in a given country. With respect to Pakistan, policymakers have long feared that Pakistanis' support for shari`a indicates a preference for a kind of governance evidenced during the Taliban's governance of Afghanistan. Worse, they have taken this to be a proxy for greater support for Islamist violence generally and violence aimed at American interests in particular.
These fears, in part, motivate American preferences for greater secularism in countries like Pakistan. Our findings suggest that such reasoning is not only empirically unjustified, but may also be counterproductive. Depending upon how individuals within a particular context and time period conceptualize a shari`a-based government, public support for shari`a can either be a positive force for democracy or a predictor of support for militant politics. Many of the existing assumptions about Islam posit a negative relationship with democracy, and suggest that secularized politics divorcing religion from the region's political realm would be preferable. These assumptions also appear to undergird policy initiatives in the region. In reality, employing Islamic rhetoric and emphasizing the democratic aspects of Islamic law may be helpful in drumming up support for democratic values, as well as for related policies and programs.
